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NOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EX POST FACTO-WAS 
ADDING THE REQUIREMENT OF GUBERNATORIAL 
APPROVAL OF PAROLE TO THE PATUXENT 
INSTITUTION'S PAROLE PROCEDURES AND 
REINSTATING ORIGINAL SENTENCES A VIOLATION OF 
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS? 
Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898, cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 950 (1990). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Gluckstern v. Sutton,) the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that adding the requirement of gubernatorial approval for parole 
of a defendant committed to the Patuxent Institution and reinstating 
the original life sentence that was suspended under the old statutory 
scheme violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. According 
to the Sutton court, this change required that an inmate sentenced 
under the prior law take an unnecessary and unconstitutional addi-
tional step before his parole could be granted. 2 
Both the Defective Delinquent Law3 and the Patuxent Institute 
Act (the "1977 Act"),4 however, are not penal laws, but civil laws 
to which the ex post facto prohibition does not apply. Further, the 
principles used to determine if there is a violation of the prohibition 
against ex post facto laws do not indicate that prisoner Sutton was 
disadvantaged by retrospective application of the requirement of 
gubernatorial approval of parole or the reinstatement of his original 
sentence. 
II. FACTS 
Richard Lee Sutton killed his estranged wife's parents with a 
handgun on March 5, 1974. On January 10, 1975, he was convicted 
on two counts of first degree murder and two counts of using a 
handgun in the commission of a felony or a crime of violence. Sutton 
was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the 
l. 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990). 
2. Sutton, 319 Md. at 669, 574 A.2d at 915. 
3. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
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murders and two concurrent terms of twelve years for the handgun 
offenses to be served concurrently with the life sentences. 5 
The court also found reasonable ground to believe that Sutton 
was a defective delinquent, and he was sent to Patuxent Institution 
(Patuxent) for evaluation.6 Sutton was declared a defective delinquent 
on July 17, 1975, and, pursuant to the Defective Delinquent Law 
then in effect, was committed to Patuxent for an indeterminate 
period. As a consequence of this determination, his original sentence 
was suspended. 7 
Thereafter, the Defective Delinquent Law was repealed and the 
1977 Act was passed. The 1977 Act abolished the indeterminate 
sentence and replaced it with the provision that "[a] person confined 
at the [Patuxent] Institution shall be released upon expiration of his 
sentence in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as 
if he were being released from a correctional facility."8 In 1982, an 
amendment was passed changing the procedures for granting parole 
from Patuxent to provide that a person serving a life sentence "shall 
only be paroled with the approval of the Governor."9 
On October 4, 1984, the Board of Review of Patuxent recom-
mended that Sutton be paroled. The governor refused to approve 
the parole. On June 5, 1986, the board again voted to parole Sutton 
and, again, the governor refused to approve the board's decision. 
On November 6, 1987, Sutton filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus arguing that application of the 1977 Act and the 1982 
amendment violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County held that reinstating the original 
sentence and retroactively applying the requirement for the governor's 
approval of parole disadvantaged Sutton "because it create[d] an 
additional step which was not required before."10 Therefore, the 
court concluded that the prohibition against ex post facto laws found 
in the Maryland Declaration of Rightsll and the United States 
Constitutionl2 was violated. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted Gluckstern's petition for writ of certiorari and affirmed the 
circuit court's decision. 
5. Id. at 638, 574 A.2d at 899-900. 
6. Id. at 638, 574 A.2d at 900. 
7. Id. at 638-39, 574 A.2d at 900. 
8. Id. at 642, 574 A.2d at 901. An inmate serving a life sentence at an institution 
under the authority of the Department of Correction would not be considered 
for parole until fifteen years of his sentence had been served. Id. at 640, 574 
A.2d at 901 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 122(b». Any recommendation 
made by the Maryland Board of Parole had to be approved by the governor. 
Id. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § I 22(b». 
9. Sutton, 319 Md. at 643, 574 A.2d at 902. 
10. Id. at 645, 574 A.2d at 903. 
II. See infra note 14. 
12. See infra note 14. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. Ex Post Facto Laws 
As one court noted, "[s]o much importance did the [C]onvention 
attach to [the ex post facto prohibition], that it is found twice in 
the Constitution." 13 Both the federal and state governments are 
prohibited from passing any ex post facto law by the United States 
Constitution. 14 The fundamental concern behind the prohibition against 
ex post facto laws is not an individual's right to less punishment, 
but the "lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the 
legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when 
the crime was consummated." 15 
What constitutes an ex post facto law was first set forth in 
Calder v. BU//: 16 
1 st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing 
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; 
and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a 
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 
13. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883), overruled by Collins v. Young-
blood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (holding that ex post facto prohibition is not violated 
by retroactively applying a statute allowing a court to reform a verdict rather 
than ordering a new trial). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed."); U.S. 
CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto law 
.... "). The ex post facto prohibition in the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
has the same meaning as the ex post facto clause in the United States 
Constitution. Anderson v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 310 Md. 
217, 223, 528 A.2d 904, 907 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913 (1988), quoted 
in Sutton, 319 Md. at 665, 574 A.2d at 913. The Maryland ex post facto 
clause reads as follows: 
That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence 
of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, 
unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law 
ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction imposed, 
or required. 
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 17. 
15. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981); Alston v. Robinson, 791 F. Supp. 
569, 588 (D. Md. 1992). 
16. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). The modern formulation of the prohibition against 
ex post facto laws is set forth in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925): 
It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their 
citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a 
crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; 
which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its 
commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense 
available according to the law at the time when the act was committed, 
is prohibited as ex post facto. 
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3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, 
when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules 
of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than 
the law required at the time of the commission of the 
offense, in order to convict the ojjender. 17 
Civil legislation, however, is not affected by the prohibition against 
ex post facto laws. IS 
For there to be a violation of the prohibition, a law must be 
retrospective and must disadvantage the offender .19 Even if a law is 
retrospective and disadvantages the offender, however, it may not 
be a violation of the ex post facto prohibition if it is merely 
procedural in nature. 20 
1. Retrospective Requirement 
To violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, a law must 
apply to events occurring before its enactment. 21 The prohibition is 
not limited to laws changing the penalty for the offense, but extends 
to any law enacted after the commission of a crime that effectively 
increases the punishment. 22 
For example, in Weaver v. Graham,23 the Supreme Court stated 
that "good time"24 for good conduct in prison is "part of the 
punishment annexed to the crime. "25 The prospect of reducing the 
amount of the sentence to be served by the use of good time is a 
"determinant of petitioner's prison term and ... his effective sen-
tence is altered once this determinant is changed. "26 It does not 
17. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390. 
18. Baltimore & Susquehanna R.R. Co. v. Nesbit, 51 U.S. 395, 402 (1850); see 
also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 n.2 (1990). 
19. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29; see also Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 
(1932); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DaB.) at 390. 
20. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977). 
21. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29. If a law "changes the legal consequences of acts 
completed before its effective date," it is retrospective. Miller v. Florida, 482 
U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31). 
22. 319 Md. 634, 665, 574 A.2d 898, 913 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 
171 (1890), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990». 
23. 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 
24. "'Good time' is awarded for good conduct and reduces the period of sentence 
which prisoner must spend in prison although it does not reduce the period of 
the sentence itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990). 
25. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31 (discussing material presented in Respondent's Brief). 
26. Id. at 32. The court noted itS'long standing recognition that the defendant's 
decision to enter into a plea bargain, and the judge's calculation of the sentence 
to be imposed, is significantly affected by the chances for reduced imprison-
ment. Id. (citing Wolff v, McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); Warden v. 
Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658 (1974». 
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matter that the change only applies to good time earned after the 
effective date of the law. As the Court stated: "It is the effect, not 
the form, of the law that determines whether it is ex post facto. "27 
Changes in parole requirements are considered retrospective if 
they "alter the consequences attached to a crime for which a prisoner 
already has been sentenced. "28 For example, parole eligibility is 
regarded as part of the law annexed to the crime.29 In Fender v. 
Thompson,30 the Fourth Circuit confronted an amended parole statute 
applied retroactively, making a prisoner permanently ineligible for 
parole. According to the court, the amended statute "expressly 
rescinded preexisting parole eligibility - and to that extent ran afoul 
of the ex post facto clause. "31 The court stated that "retrospective 
application of a statute modifying or revoking parole eligibility would 
... 'substantially alter[] the consequences attached to a crime already 
completed, and therefore change[] the quantum of punishment,'" 
and this is exactly what is forbidden by the prohibition against ex 
post facto laws.32 
2. Disadvantage Requirement 
Even if a law is retrospective, however, to be considered a 
violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws it must also 
operate to the person's disadvantage. 33 The amount of "gain time"34 
that can be accumulated to reduce an inmate's term cannot be 
27. [d. at 31. Further, a statute requiring solitary confinement prior to execution 
was an ex post facto violation when applied to someone who committed the 
crime prior to the statute's enactment. [d. at 32. Laws altering the length of 
sentences or changing the maximum sentence from discretionary to mandatory 
are also retrospective. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937). 
28. Burnside v. White, 760 F.2d 217, 220 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 
(1985). 
29. Lerner v. Gill, 751 F.2d 450, 454 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1010 (1985). 
30. 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989). 
31. [d. at 305. 
32. [d. at 306 (finding violation of ex post facto law prohibition where application 
of an amended statute to an inmate resulted in the inmate being eligible for 
parole at a later time, and served to effectively increase the punishment to be 
served on a previous conviction) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33 (citing 
Dubbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 (1977»). Fixing the date of parole 
eligibility is part of the punishment, and punishment cannot constitutionally 
be made "greater or more severe." Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396, 398 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
33. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). "Whether a retrospective state 
criminal statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its predecessor 
is a federal question." [d. at 33. 
34. 'Gain time' is various kinds of time credited to reduce an inmate's prison term. 
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 25 n.l. 
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changed if doing so increases the time a person will spend in prison. 3s 
To hold otherwise results in imposing a punishment more severe than 
the punishment available under the law when the crime was com-
mitted. 
The focus of the disadvantage inquiry is upon the challenged 
provision, and not "any special circumstances that may mitigate its 
effect on the particular individual. "36 For example, even if the 
defendant cannot show that he definitely would have been affected 
by the change, the law may still operate to his disadvantage. In 
Lindsey v. Washington,37 the defendant was deprived of any oppor-
tunity to receive a lesser sentence by retrospective application of a 
law. 38 In Dobbert v. Florida, the Supreme Court stated that the 
Lindsey decision meant that "one is not barred from challenging a 
change in the penal code on ex post facto grounds simply because 
the sentence he received under the new law was not more onerous 
than that which he might have received under the old. "39 
It may not be to the prisoner's disadvantage to make changes 
which codify existing practices or to make discretionary practices 
mandatory. For example, it was not a violation of the ex post facto 
prohibition for a new statute to require dual hearings for inmates 
seeking parole and to increase the number of votes needed before 
parole would be granted, because the parole board had the discretion 
to do so when the inmates committed their crimes.4O 
A majority of courts hold that retrospective application of 
amended federal parole guidelines does not violate the ex post facto 
prohibition because the guidelines are not laws.41 This is true even if 
the prisoner is disadvantaged by retrospective application of the 
amended guidelines.42 Other courts take the position that federal 
35. [d. at 33. 
36. [d. 
37. 301 U.S. 397 (1937). When petitioner committed the crime, the law provided 
for a minimum sentence of six months and a maximum of fifteen years. By 
the time he was sentenced, the law provided for a mandatory fifteen year 
sentence. 
38. [d. at 401-02 (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 299 (1977». 
39. 432 U.S. 282, 300 (1977). 
40. United States ex rei. Chaka v. Lane, 685 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1988); 
Davis-El v. O'Leary, 626 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Prior to the new 
law, the board possessed the power to review requests for parole and had 
established a practice of hearing certain cases en banco The new requirement 
for an en banc procedure therefore codifies prior law and does not disadvantage 
those sentenced prior to the law. [d. at 1041. 
41. See, e.g., Yamamoto v. United States Parole Comm'n, 794 F.2d 1295, 1297 
(8th CiT. 1986). 
42. [d. The guidelines in effect at the time he committed the crime provided that 
he would be recommended for parole after a term of imprisonment of forty 
to fifty-two months. The guidelines as amended recommended parole after a 
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guidelines are merely discretionary, and that, therefore, the ex post 
facto prohibition does not apply.43 Another view is that retrospective 
application of amended federal parole guidelines does not result in 
a more onerous punishment, and, therefore, is not a violation of the 
ex post facto prohibition.44 
3. Procedure Versus Substance Distinction 
The prohibition against ex post facto laws does not extend to 
"legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do 
not affect matters of substance.' '45 This is the case even if the law 
is retrospective and operates to the prisoner's disadvantage. Proce-
dural changes affecting substantive rights, however, may violate the 
ex post facto law prohibition "even if the statute takes a seemingly 
procedural form."46 
Early cases applying the procedure/substance distinction involved 
changes in trial procedure or rules of evidence.47 These early cases 
determined that the ex post facto prohibition does not give a person 
a right to be "tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the 
crime charged was committed.' '48 For example, the ex post facto 
prohibition was not violated by changes in the law allowing a 
convicted felon to be called as a witness,49 admitting previously 
inadmissible evidence, 50 changing the place of trial, 51 extending the 
term of one hundred months or more. Based on the new guidelines, petitioner 
had to serve fifty-six months before being paroled. 
43. Id. at 1297-98; Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 195 
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982). 
44. Yamamoto, 794 F.2d at 1298; Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1549 (lIth 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985). 
45. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433 (1987) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 
U.S. 282, 293 (1977». 
46. Miller, 482 U.S. at 433 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 
(1981». In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), the Supreme Court 
defined the scope of the prohibition against ex post facto laws as it relates to 
laws affecting procedure. According to the Court, "by simply labelling a law 
'procedural,' a legislature does not thereby immunize it from scrutiny under 
the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 46. The "prohibition which may not be 
evaded, [however], is the one defined by the Calder categories." Id. The Court 
cautioned that the "substantial protections" and "personal rights" referred to 
in Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894) and Malloy v. South Carolina, 
237 U.S. 180 (1915). "should not be read to adopt without explanation an 
undefined enlargement of the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. 
47. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925). 
48. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896). 
49. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
50. Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898). 
51. Gut v. State, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1869). 
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statute of limitations for a crime,52 or abolishing a court for hearing 
criminal appeals and creating a different one in its placeY Such 
changes do not increase the punishment nor "change the ingredients 
of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt. "54 
The prohibition against ex post facto laws is violated, however, 
by changing the law to deprive "one charged with a crime of any 
defense available according to law at the time when the act was 
committed."55 In Dobbert v. Florida,56 the Supreme Court held that 
changing the role of the judge and jury when imposing the death 
penalty did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 57 
Prior to the change, the jury determined whether the defendant 
would be sentenced to death and this decision was not subject to 
review by the judge. The new law provided that the jury's determi-
nation was not binding on the judge. The change was held to be 
procedural and not to affect a substantive right. 58 The statute "simply 
altered the methods employed in determining whether the death 
penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of 
punishment attached to the crime. "59 
Later cases extended the procedure versus substance distinction 
beyond changes in trial procedure. In Portley v. Grossman,60 parole 
guidelines different from those in effect when the petitioner was 
sentenced were used to determine the date he would be eligible for 
parole. The Supreme Court reasoned that simply because a defendant 
is disadvantaged by a change in the law does not mean that the 
prohibition against ex post facto law is violated. 61 The purpose of 
the prohibition is to "secure 'substantial personal rights' from ret-
roactive deprivation and does not 'limit the legislative control of 
remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of 
substance." '62 The Portley Court found the changes were of the 
procedural type deemed permissible in Dobbert.63 
52. United States ex rei. Massarella v. Elrod, 682 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983); Clements v. United States, 266 F.2d 397, 
399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 985 (1959). 
53. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894). 
54. Massarella, 682 F.2d at 689 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 
(1981) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, ItO U.S. 574, 590 (1884))). 
55. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925). 
56. 432 U.S. 282 (1977). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 292. The Beazell Court stated that a procedural change need not be 
ameliorative to survive an ex post facto challenge. Beazell, 269 U.S. at 167. 
59. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94. 
60. 444 U.S. 1311 (1980). 
61. Id. at 1312. 
62. Id; (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293 (1977». 
63. Id. at 1313. Federal courts have held that adding a requirement that a victim 
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This trend was followed in United States v. Moit,64 where the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
applying a new standard for bail pending the appeal of a defendant 
already convicted of a crime did not violate the prohibition.65 Al-
though it would be more difficult to get bail, "[t]he change in the 
balance of advantages against the defendant is too slight to bring 
the change within the scope of the ex post facto clause."66 
In Raimondo v. Belletire,67 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a stat-
utory change providing that the court and the state's attorney may 
review a mental hospital's decision to release a patient committed to 
the hospital after being acquitted of a crime because of insanity. 
According to the court, the change was procedural and the increase 
in hardship was negligible. 68 The court's decision was based upon 
the following factors: (1) review of the hospital's decision was dis-
cretionary and not automatic; (2) if the decision was reviewed by the 
court or the state's attorney, it must be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that the patient needed continued hospitalization; and (3) 
the patient's other avenues of release were unaffected or enhanced.69 
Because of these safeguards, the change was "not so far-reaching 
that it significantly affect[ed] substantial personal rights. "70 
B. The Patuxent Institution 
1. History 
In 1951, after a great deal of research,71 Maryland adopted the 
Defective Delinquent Law. 72 The law was passed to deal with a 
of a crime be notified of a parole request by a prisoner was only a procedural 
change and did not affect substantive rights. Mosley v. Klincar, 711 F. Supp. 
463, 468 (N.D. Ill. 1989), a/I'd, 947 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1991); Alston v. 
Robinson, 791 F. Supp. 569, 591 (D. Md. 1992). 
64. 758 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1985). 
65. Id. at 1200. 
66. Id. at 1201. 
67. 789 F .2d 492 (7th Cir. 1986). 
68. Id. at 496. 
69. Id.; see also Alston v. Robinson, 791 F. Supp. 569, 593 (D. Md. 1992). 
70. Raimondo, 789 F.2d at 496. 
71. Williams v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 276 Md. 272, 284-85, 347 A.2d 179, 
185-86 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 
504, 514, 121 A.2d 698, 702 (1956). 
72. Act of Apr. 20, 1951, ch. 476, 1951 Md. Laws 1343 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 31B), repealed by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 678, 1977 Md. Laws 
2723. 
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category of criminal who is legally sane and should be responsible 
for his acts, but who is of deficient intellect or is emotionally 
unbalanced and therefore lacks control.73 The legislature felt that the 
welfare of the community would be best served by treating such 
people rather than punishing them.74 The Patuxent Institution was 
opened on January 1, 1955, to house these people and has been 
characterized as "neither a prison, a hospital, nor an insane asylum, 
but an institution which exercises some of the functions of all 
three."75 
A person found to be a defective delinquenC6 was confined to 
Patuxent for an indefinite period and the balance of the sentence 
imposed by the court suspended.77 In this way, a defective delinquent 
73. Director of Patuxent Inst. v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 31, 221 A.2d 397, 405-06, 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966). Furthermore, 
the statute rejects the age old concept that every legally sane person 
possesses in equal degree the free will to choose between doing right 
and doing wrong. Instead it substitutes the concept that there is a 
category of legally sane persons who by reason of mental or emotional 
deficiencies "evidence a propensity toward criminal activity," which 
they are incapable of controlling. 
Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 1964). 
74. "For those in the category who are treatable it would substitute psychiatric 
treatment for punishment in the conventional sense and would free them from 
confinement, not when they have 'paid their debt to society,' but when they 
have been sufficiently cured to make it reasonably safe to release them." Sas, 
334 F.2d at 516. 
75. Daniels, 243 Md. at 32, 221 A.2d at 406 (quoting Eggleston, 209 Md. at 513, 
121 A.2d at 702). 
76. The Defective Delinquent Law defined a defective delinquent as 
an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated 
antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal 
activity, and who is found to have either such intellectual deficiency 
or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual 
danger to society so as to require such confinement and treatment, 
when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for society to 
terminate the confinement and treatment. 
Daniels, 243 Md. at 33, 221 A.2d at 407 (quoting MD. CODE ANN. art. 31B, 
§ 5 (1957 & Supp. 1964»; see also Act of Apr. 20, 1951, ch. 476, § 5, 1951 
Md. Laws 1348. 
77. The Defective Delinquent Law stated: 
If the court or the jury, as the case may be, shall find and determine 
that the said defendant is a defective delinquent, the court shall so 
inform the defendant, and shall order him to be committed or returned 
to the institution for confinement as a defective delinquent, for an 
indeterminate period without either maximum or minimum limits. In 
such event, the sentence for the original criminal conviction, or any 
unexpired portion thereof, shall be and remain suspended, and the 
defendant shall no longer be confined for any portion of said original 
sentence, except as otherwise provided herein. Instead, the defendant 
shall thenceforth remain in the custody of the institution for defective 
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would not be released until it reasonably appeared that it was safe 
to return him to the community. 78 This provision recognized that 
mental illness is very difficult to cure "and will usually require 
confinement for considerable duration in order effectively to complete 
the treatment process. "79 
The Defective Delinquent Law was repealed in 1977 and replaced 
with the Patuxent Institution Act. 80 The 1977 Act provided that 
confinement was no longer for an indeterminate period, and the 
inmates' original sentences were reinstated.81 The change was in 
response to criticisms that, under the old scheme, a person could 
remain confined in Patuxent long after expiration of the original 
sentence.82 
2. Procedure for Release from Patuxent 
Prior to 1977, the Board of Review of Patuxent83 reviewed each 
person held at the institution at least once each year. 84 The board, 
delinquents, subject to the provisions of this article. 
Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 639 n.3, 574 A.2d 898, 900 n.3 (quoting 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B § 9(b) (1971», cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990); 
see also Act of Apr. 20, 1951, ch. 476, § 9(b), 1951 Md. Laws 1343, 1351. 
78. See supra note 76 (providing definition of defective delinquent); see also 
Williams v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 276 Md. 272, 285, 347 A.2d 179, 186 
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); Daniels, 243 Md. at 32, 221 A.2d 
at 406. 
79. Williams, 276 Md. at 287, 347 A.2d at 187. 
80. The Defective Delinquent Law was repealed by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 678, 
1977 Md. Laws 2723, which also enacted a new MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, 
entitled "Patuxent Institution." The stated purpose of Patuxent Institution was 
"to provide efficient and adequate programs and services for treatment and 
rehabilitation of eligible persons." Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 678, § 2, 1977 
Md. Laws 2723, 2729 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 2 (1990». An 
eligible person was defined as a person who: 
(1) has been convicted of a crime and is serving a sentence of 
imprisonment with at least three years remaining on it, (2) has an 
intellectual deficiency or emotional imbalance, (3) is likely to respond 
favorably to the programs and services provided at Patuxent Institu-
tion, and (4) can be better rehabilitated through those programs and 
services than by other incarceration. 
[d. § l(g), 1977 Md. Laws 2723, 2729 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 31B, § 1(0(1) (1990»; see also Watson v. State, 286 Md. 291, 298-
99, 407 A.2d 324, 328 (1979). 
81. Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 678, § ll(A), 1977 Md. Laws 2723, 2735 (codified 
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § ll(a) (1990» provided that "[a] person confined 
at the [Patuxent] Institution shall be released upon expiration of his sentence 
in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if he were being 
released from a correctional facility." See also Herd v. State, 37 Md. App. 
362, 366, 377 A.2d 574, 576 (1977). 
82. Watson, 286 Md. at 298, 407 A.2d at 328. 
83. As of 1975, the Board of Review consisted of 
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at its discretion, could grant parole and impose conditions upon such 
release.8s Furthermore, the board could 
request the court which imposed upon the person the original 
sentence resulting in his being subsequently classified as a 
defective delinquent, to reinstate the said original sentence; 
and the said court is authorized and empowered following 
such a request to reinstate and reimpose the said original 
sentence, and to cause the said person to be held in custody 
therefor .... 86 
If the sentence was reinstated, the person was returned to the 
Department of Correction where he served the sentence "upon which 
he was committed prior to being classified as a defective delin-
quent. "87 
If the Board of Review decided that a person's condition had 
improved enough that he could be unconditionally released from 
Patuxent, it informed the court that had jurisdiction over that person. 
That court then made a further study to determine whether the 
person should 
be released unconditionally from custody as a defective 
delinquent, released conditionally on a leave of absence or 
parole, returned to the custody of the Institution as a 
the Director of the Patuxent Institution, the three associate directors, 
a University of Maryland Law School professor, a member of the 
Maryland Bar, and a sociologist who was required to be a faculty 
member of a Maryland institution of higher education. 
Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 640 n.4, 574 A.2d 898, 900 n.4 (quoting 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 12 (1971 & Supp. 1975» cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
950 (1990); see also Williams, 276 Md. at 291, 347 A.2d at 189 (quoting MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 12 (1971 & Supp. 1974). 
84. Williams, 276 Md. at 291, 347 A.2d at 189 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, 
§ 13(b) (1971 & Supp. 1974». The defective delinquent could also periodically 
request a hearing to' determine whether he is still a defective delinquent. [d. 
(citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, §10 (1971 & Supp. 1974». 
85. Sutton, 319 Md. at 639-40, 574 A.2d at 900. The statute provided that 
[ilf the institutional board of review as a result of its review and 
reexamination of any person believes that it may be for his benefit 
and for the benefit of society to grant him a . . . parole from the 
institution for defective delinquents, it may proceed to arrange for 
such ... parole .... The board may attach to any such ... parole 
such conditions as to it seem wise or necessary .... 
[d. at 640 n.4, 574 A.2d at 900 n.4 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 13(d) 
(l971 & Supp. 1975» (alterations in original). 
86. Williams, 276 Md. at 291-92, 347 A.2d at 189 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 
31B, § 13(d) (1971 & Supp. 1974». 
87. [d. at 292, 347 A.2d at 190 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 13(f) (1971 
& Supp. 1974». 
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defective delinquent, or returned to the Department of Cor-
rection, to serve the original sentence upon which he was 
committed prior to being classified as a defective delin-
quent.88 
353 
As noted, the Defective Delinquent Law was repealed in 1977 
and a new law adopted, providing that confinement would no longer 
be for an indeterminate period, and also providing for the reinstate-
ment of the inmates' original sentences.89 In 1982, the 1977 Act was 
amended (the "1982 Amendment") to provide that a person in 
Patuxent serving a life sentence would only be paroled upon approval 
of the governor. 9(1 
3. Civil Nature of the Defective Delinquent Law 
In Eggleston v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that the Defective Delinquent Law was civil in nature.91 In Director 
oj Patuxent Institution v. Daniels,92 the court stated that it was 
important to determine if the law was civil "because only if the 
statute is regulatory can the precise criminal procedures required to 
uphold the constitutionality of a penal statute be dispensed with. "93 
According to the Daniels court, the legislative history of the Defective 
Delinquent Law indicated that its 
sole objective and purpose was not penal but an effort to 
segregate a known group of mentally disordered people who 
are found guilty of criminal acts, by confining them in an 
institution housing only members of their group in a sole 
effort to protect society and provide treatment to effect, if 
possible, a cure of the illness .... 94 
Part of this objective was to release the inmates when they are no 
longer a danger to themselves or to society. 9S 
88. [d. at 292, 347 A.2d at 189-90 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 13(0 
(1971 & Supp. 1974». 
89. See supra note 81. 
90. Acts of 1982, ch. 588, § 11 (b)(2) , 1982 Md. Laws 3479, 3480 (codified as 
amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 11(b)(3) (1990». The statute was 
changed to add the following sentence: "an eligible person who is serving a 
term of life imprisonment shall only be paroled with the approval of the 
Governor." [d:; see also Sutton, 319 Md. at 643, 574 A.2d at 902. 
91. Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 513-14, 121 A.2d 698, 703 (1956); see also 
Herd v. State, 37 Md. App. 362, 377 A.2d 574 (1977) (failure to cooperate 
. with Patuxent Institution doctors constitutes only a civil contempt). 
92. 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966). 
93. [d. at 37, 221 A.2d at 409. 
94. [d. at 38, 221 A.2d at 410. 
95. [d. 
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The court in Daniels stated that the face of the statute indicated 
that it is civil in nature.96 Affirmative restraint is provided to'protect 
society and to protect and treat the individuals. They are placed in 
an institution solely for defective delinquents; this type of punishment 
has long been regarded as regulatory. There is no requirement of 
scienter in the Act, and it was not enacted to promote the goals of 
punishment, retribution and deterrence. Defective delinquency is not 
a crime but a mental condition, and protecting society and attempting 
to treat those suffering from mental illness are valid state purposes. 
Further, the sanctions are not excessive, since most experts agree that 
treatment cannot be related to a fixed period of time.97 
Categorizing the Defective Delinquent Law as a civil, rather than 
penal, law has important ramifications. For example, the Daniels 
court rejected the defendant's claim that, because he remained con-
fined after his original sentence expired, his constitutional rights were 
violated because he was "twice placed in jeopardy for the same 
offense. "98 According to the court, confinement to Patuxent is a 
civil proceeding, and it does not involve a person "being placed in 
jeopardy for the commission of a crime."99 In other cases, the court 
of appeals determined that there was no right to counsel during the 
defective delinquent examination, no privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, and no right to a speedy trial. lOo Further, there was no right 
to confront witnesses,101 and the burden of proof was not "beyond 
a reasonable doubt." 102 
In response to a claim that the prohibition against ex post facto 
96. Id. at 39, 221 A.2d at 410. To determine whether an act is penal or civil in 
nature from the face of the act, the following must be considered: 
[W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter; whether its operation 
will promote the traditional aims of punishment, that is, retribution 
and deterrence; whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime; whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it; and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963». 
97. Id. at 40, 221 A.2d at 411. 
98. Id. at 47, 221 A.2d at 415. 
99. Id. at 47, 221 A.2d at 415-16. 
100. Williams v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 276 Md. 272, 296, 347 A.2d 179, 192 
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); Wood v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 
243 Md. 731, 733, 223 A.2d 175, 176-77 (1966). 
101. Mastromarino v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 243 Md. 704, 705-06, 221 A.2d 
910, 911 (1966). 
102. Dickerson v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 235 Md. 668, 670, 202 A.2d 765, 767 
(1964). 
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laws had been violated, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated in 
Simmons v. Director oj Patuxent Institution lO3 that the Defective 
Delinquent Law was civil, and not penal, in nature, and that the 
prohibition did not apply. 104 The court also took this position in 
Monroe v . . Director oj Patuxent Institution, lOS where a statute was 
changed to add the requirement that at least two-thirds of an inmate's 
original sentence must be served before a petition for redetermination 
could be made. The prior law provided that the inmate need only 
have been confined for two years before a petition could be made. 
The amendment also limited the right to appeal. According to the 
court, the fact that the change in the statute was made after Monroe 
was confined to Patuxent did not matter, since proceedings under 
the statute are civil, but not penal, in nature. 106 
4. The Civil Nature of the 1977 Act 
It is not as clear that the 1977 Act is also civil in nature. In 
Watson v. State,l07 the court of appeals stated that although the 
Defective Delinquent Law was repealed, "the entire concept of the 
former law was not entirely abandoned. "108 As the court noted, the 
1977 Act was adopted "to provide efficient and adequate programs 
and services for the treatment and rehabilitation of eligible per-
sons."I09 An eligible person includes one who has been convicted of 
a crime, has an intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, is 
likely to respond to the programs and treatment offered at Patuxent, 
and is more likely to be rehabilitated through these services than by 
other incarceration. 11O 
Applying the Daniels test,11I it appears from the face of the 1977 
Act that it is civil in nature. As with the Defective Delinquent Law, 
affirmative restraint is utilized to provide treatment, Patuxent only 
houses people who need such treatment,112 and there is no scienter 
requirement. Even though a person transferred to Patuxent under 
103. 227 Md. 661, 177 A.2d 409 (1962). 
104. [d. at 663, 177 A.2d at 411. In Simmons, the defendant claimed that since the 
issue of his being a defective delinquent was not raised at his trial, raising the 
issue in a later hearing deprived him of the protections afforded criminal 
defendants. [d. 
105. 230 Md. 650, 653, 187 A.2d 873, 874 (1963); see also Herrman v. Director of 
Patuxent Inst., 229 Md. 613, 182 A.2d 351 (1962) (holding defective delinquent 
statute not a violation of ex post facto prohibitions). 
106. Monroe, 230 Md. at 653, 187 A.2d at 874. 
107. 286 Md. 291, 407 A.2d 324 (1979). 
108. [d. at 298, 407 A.2d at 328. 
109. [d. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 2(b) (1990». 
110. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 1(0(1) (1990); Watson, 286 Md. at 298-99, 407 
A.2d at 328. 
111. See supra note 96. 
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 1(0(1) (1990). 
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the 1977 Act remains in the custody of the Department of Correc-
tion,1I3 provisions of the 1977 Act indicate that it was not enacted 
to promote the goals of punishment, retribution and deterrence, but 
rather to treat those suffering from mental illnessy4 This is evidenced 
by one of the stated purposes of the 1977 Act, which is "to provide 
efficient and adequate programs and services for treatment with the 
goal of rehabilitation."1IS Staff members include psychiatrists, be-
havioral scientists, clinical psychiatrists, social workers and a physi-
cian.1I6 Further, a treatment plan is prepared and implemented for 
each person. 1I7 
IV. RATIONALE OF THE COURT 
According to the Sutton court, changing the parole procedures 
to require approval of the governor and the institution's Board of 
Review, together with reinstating Sutton's original life sentence, 
combined to violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 118 
The court noted that the prohibition against ex post facto laws 
is not limited to laws "directly changing the penalty for the of-
fense. "119 The prohibition extends instead to any law enacted after 
the crime has been committed, which "inflicts a greater punishment 
113. [d. § 9(0. 
114. [d. § 2(b). 
115. [d. 
116. [d. § 5(a). 
117. [d. § 9(c). 
118. There is some question as to the effect· of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (overruling Kring v. Missouri, 107 
U.S. 221 (1883); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898», given the reasoning 
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Sutton. Alston v. Robinson, 
791 F. Supp. 569, 593 n.46 (D. Md. 1992). Collins, however, simply makes it 
clear that it is not enough that any. "substantial personal right" be affected 
by a retroactive application of a law such that a person is disadvantaged. 
Rather, the prohibition against ex post facto laws is violated only if the 
person's situation is disadvantaged by an alteration in the "definition of crimes 
or [an] increase [in] the punishment for criminal acts" i.e., one of the "Calder" 
categories. Collins, 497 U.S. at 43. In Sutton's case, it is implicit in the court's 
reasoning that by making it more difficult for Sutton to obtain parole,· his 
punishment was effectively increased. This falls squarely within one of the 
Calder categories and, if Sutton's punishment was in fact increased, then the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws would be violated. 
It is important to note that the Collins court cautioned that "by simply 
labelling a law 'procedural,' a legislature does not thereby immunize it from 
scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause." [d. at 46. In the words of the 
Supreme Court, "the constitutional prohibition is addressed to laws, 'whatever 
their form,' which make innocent acts criminal, alter the nature of the offense, 
or increase the punishment. But the prohibition which may not be evaded is 
the one defined by the Calder categories." [d. (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 
U.S. 167, 170 (1925» (citation omitted). 
119. Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 665, 574 A.2d 898, 913, cert. denied, 498 
U.S 950 (1990). 
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than the law annexed to the crime at the time it was committed ... 
or which alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. "120 
The prohibition extends to changes in parole requirements because 
they are a consequence of an offense, and a modification of parole 
eligibility "substantially alters the consequences attached to a crime 
already completed and therefore changes 'the quantum of punish-
ment.' "121 
The court determined that eligibility for parole was particularly 
important considering the fact that "a prisoner's eligibility for re-
duced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the 
defendant's decision to plea bargain and the judge's calculation of 
the sentence to be imposed.' '122 Numerous decisions were cited by 
the court holding that parole eligibility is part of the law annexed to 
the crime. 123 
The court emphasized that when Sutton committed his crimes, 
he faced the possibility of being found a defective delinquent and 
being committed to Patuxent for an indeterminate term without any 
provision for the governor to approve parole. Therefore, the court 
held that the 1977 Act and the 1982 Amendment combined to make 
parole more difficult to obtain because Sutton would now need the 
favorable decision of both the board and the governor .124 
According to the court, the 1982 Amendment did not make the 
board's role advisory, nor did it substitute the governor for the 
board. 125 Also, unlike the federal parole guidelines, the requirement 
for gubernatorial approval is not a discretionary internal policy but 
has the force of law. 126 Therefore, these changes "clearly operated 
to Mr. Sutton's disadvantage"127 by making it more difficult for him 
to be paroled. 128 Without further discussion, the court stated in dicta 
that, because the change involved parole eligibility and not trial 
procedure, the Dobbert procedure versus substance distinction to the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws did not apply. 129 
V. ANALYSIS 
Despite the court's conclusion, it is arguable that no violation 
of the prohibition against ex post facto laws occurred in Sutton. The 
120. Id. (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890». 
121. Id. at 665, 574 A.2d at 913 (quoting Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303, 306 
(4th Cir. 1989». 
122. Sutton, 319 Md. at 666, 574 A.2d at 913-14 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 
U.S. 24, 32 (1981». 
123. Id. at 665-69, 574 A.2d at 913-15. 
124. Id. at 669, 574 A.2d at 915. 
125. Id. at 671, 574 A.2d at 916. 
126. Id. at 672, 574 A.2d at 916. 
127. Id. at 669, 574 A.2d at 915. 
128. Id. at 672, 574 A.2d at 916. 
129. Id. at 670, 574 A.2d at 916. 
358 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
civil nature of the Defective Delinquent Law and the 1977 Act indicate 
that the prohibition is inapplicable. 130 Further, the principles used to 
determine if there is a violation of the prohibition also indicate that 
retrospective application of the 1977 Act and the 1982 Amendment 
did not disadvantage Sutton by increasing his punishment. 
The court did not discuss the line of cases holding that the 
Defective Delinquent Law was a civil law to which the prohibition 
against ex post facto laws did not apply.131 Because the Defective 
Delinquent Law was in effect when Sutton committed his crimes, 
that law should have been applied. If precedent had been followed, 
therefore, reinstating the original sentence and adding the requirement 
of gubernatorial approval of parole would not have violated the 
prohibition regardless of whether the defendant was disadvantaged. 
The issue of whether the 1977 Act is also civil in nature was likewise 
not addressed by the court. Again, if the 1977 Act is civil in nature, 
the prohibition against ex post facto laws is inapplicable. 
The Sutton court's view that parole eligibility is a consequence 
attached to a crime and, therefore, changes in parole requirements 
may violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, is consistent 
with the current trend. Further, there is no question that the 1977 
Act, reimposing Sutton's original sentence, and the 1982 Amendment, 
adding the requirement of the governor's approval of parole, were 
retrospectively applied to Sutton. It is not clear, however, that 
applying these laws disadvantaged Sutton if one looks to the policy 
behind the prohibition. 132 
The underlying policy of the prohibition against ex post facto 
laws is fairness. 133 The criminal must be aware of the consequences 
attached to a particular crime when it is committed. In this case, 
when Sutton committed his crime the law provided that, if convicted, 
he would serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. 134 Only 
after being sentenced to the Department of Correction would it be 
possible for him to be found a defective delinquent and committed 
to Patuxent. The chance of being sent to Patuxent, therefore, was 
only a remote consequence attached to his crime. The time at which 
the crime is committed determines whether there is a violation of the 
130. See infra notes 91-117 and accompanying text. 
131. Williams v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 276 Md. 272, 347 A.2d 179 (1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); Monroe v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 230 
Md. 650, 653, 187 A.2d 873, 874 (1963); Simmons v. Director of Patuxent 
Inst., 227 Md. 661, 177 A.2d 409 (1962). 
132. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987). 
133. Jd.; see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). 
134. The parole regulations then in effect in the Department of Correction required 
that the governor approve parole. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 122(b) (1957). 
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prohibition of ex post facto laws, not the time of sentencing or the 
determination that the defendant is a defective delinquent. 13s 
The dissent supports the view that the 1977 Act and 1982 
Amendment did not combine to result in unfair surprise, and, there-
fore, did not disadvantage the defendant. 136 The terms and conditions 
of Sutton's original sentence were reimposed, no additional time was 
added to the sentence, and the requirements for parole remained the 
same. The changes did not make the punishment more burdensome 
than it was at the time Sutton committed his crime,137 but simply 
put Sutton in the same position he was in at the time he committed 
the murders.138 At that time there was only a bare possibility that he 
would be found a defective delinquent and sent to Patuxent. 139 
It can be argued that the 1977 Act and the 1982 Amendment 
only served to make discretionary policies mandatory. Under the 
Defective Delinquent Law, the Board of Review, at its discretion, 
could grant parole. l40 The board could also, at its discretion, request 
that the court reimpose the original sentence. 141 If the original sen-
tence was reimposed, the inmate was returned to the Department of 
Correction to serve his time. 142 The inmate was then subject to the 
department's procedures regarding parole which required the gover-
nor's approval of parole. 143 Also, if the board decided to uncondi-
tionally release the inmate, then the court having jurisdiction over 
135. A case recently decided by the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland disagrees with this proposition. Alston v. Robinson, 791 F. Supp. 
569 (D. Md. 1992). According to the court: 
Although it may be true that plaintiffs, once sentenced, are both 
initially and ultimately under the jurisdiction of the Maryland Division 
of Correction, the fact remains that for thirteen years prior to March 
20, 1989, Patuxent Institution and the Division of Correction were 
operating under and applying different statutes with regard to parole. 
Although none of those inmates eligible to participate in the Patuxent 
program had any vested right to remain at that institution, once there, 
Patuxent's work release scheme became one of the determinates of 
those inmates' prison sentences. 
Id. at 590. This reasoning fails to recognize, however, that it is the point at 
which the crime is committed that the ex post facto prohibition is triggered, 
not once a person is confined to a particular institution. In the cases of Alston 
and Sutton, confinement at Patuxent was only a remote possibility at the time 
their crimes were committed. 
136. Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 673, 574 A.2d 898, 917, cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 950 (1990). 
137. Id. at 673, 574 A.2d at 917. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra note 8. 
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that person could return the inmate to the Department of Correc-
tion.l44 As other decisions have held, and as the court itself indicated, 
making a discretionary policy mandatory does not violate the pro-
hibition against ex post facto laws. 145 
Finally, the court indicated that the procedure versus substance 
distinction was inapplicable in this case because changes in trial 
procedure were not involved. l46 The trend in other jurisdictions, 
however, is to extend this distinction beyond trial procedure to 
encompass changes made in parole eligibility requirements. 147 
VI. IMPACT OF THE DECISION 
Aside from not following precedent and failing to note that the 
Defective Delinquent Law is a civil law, the Sutton court did not 
address the question of whether the 1977 Act is civil or penal in 
nature. The court proceeded instead upon the assumption that the 
1977 Act is a penal law. 
Characterizing the 1977 Act as penal in nature has important 
ramifications, for only if a law is civil can the "precise criminal 
procedures required to uphold the constitutionality of a penal statute" 
be dispensed with}48 For example, if the 1977 Act is a penal law, 
inmates may have a right to counsel during the evaluation,149 and it 
may be possible to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 150 
Further, any change to the 1977 Act retrospectively applied to an 
inmate's disadvantage will be subject to the prohibition against ex 
post facto laws, as in Sutton. 
Assuming that a person in Sutton's position is disadvantaged by 
retrospective application of the 1977 Act and the 1982 Amendment, 
and assuming that the 1977 Act is a penal law, the fatal flaw in the 
1982 Amendment is that it requires approval of both the board and 
the governor to decide in favor of parole. The legislature should 
consider following the court's suggestion and make "the role of the 
Board simply advisory or substitute the Governor for the Board" in 
144. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
145. United States ex rei. Chaka v. Lane, 685 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1988); 
Davis-EI v. O'Leary, 626 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also Alston 
v. Robinson, 791 F. Supp. 569 (D. Md. 1992); Sutton, 319 Md. at 670-72,574 
A.2d at 916. 
146. Sutton, 319 Md. at 670-72, 574 A.2d at 916. 
147. PortIey v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311, 1312 (1980). 
148. Director of Patuxent Inst. v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 37, 221 A.2d 397, 409, 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966). 
149. Williams v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 276 Md. 272, 347 A.2d 179 (1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); Wood v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 243 
Md. 731, 733, 223 A.2d 175, 176-77 (1966). , 
150. Williams, 276 Md. 272, 347 A.2d 179; Wood, 243 Md. 731, 233 A.2d 175. 
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order for the law to survive a challenge based upon ex post facto 
grounds. lSI Another option suggested by the court that achieves the 
same result is to make the governor's approval discretionary or 
advisory. 
Finally, the court takes a very narrow view of when the procedure 
versus substance distinction to the prohibition against ex post· facto 
laws applies. The court suggests that only trial procedural changes 
fall within the Dobbert distinction. By taking this position, however, 
it has chosen not to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in Portley 
v. Grossman,1S2 which extends the exception to changes with respect 
to parole requirements, or the courts in other jurisdictions that 
recognize the distinction in cases involving changes in the standard 
for granting baips3 or in procedures for releasing inmates from mental 
institutions. ls4 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Prior decisions held that the Defective Delinquent Law was a 
civil law to which the prohibition against ex post facto laws did not 
apply. This was the law in effect when Sutton committed his crimes 
and, therefore, it was not necessary for the court to address the ex 
post facto question. In addition, a strong argument can be made 
that the 1977 Act is also a civil law to which the prohibition does 
not apply. 
It is important that the procedure versus substance distinction 
to the prohibition against ex post facto laws not be limited to trial 
procedure. Rather, Maryland should consider following the lead of 
the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions and extend 
the distinction beyond trial procedure, at least to encompass changes 
in parole requirements. 
The prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution has a long 
history and serves an important purpose. Fundamental principles of 
fairness dictate that a person know the consequences attached to a 
crime when it is committed. In cases such as Sutton's, however, 
retrospective application of the requirement of gubernatorial approval 
of parole and reinstatement of the original sentence only served to 
put the defendant in the position he was in at the time the crime 
was committed. There is no unfair surprise and no increase in the 
punishment attached to the crime. Under such circumstances, it is 
151. Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 671, 574 A.2d 898, 916, cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 950 (1990). 
152. 444 U.S. 1311 (1980). 
153. United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1985). 
154. Raimondo v. Belletire, 789 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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hard to argue that a violation of the prohibition against ex post 
facto laws occurred. 
Carolyn W. Evans 
